2015 Patriots Football

[Evantime34]

As long as the injured players can come back by the playoffs I think the Pats are still the favorites in the AFC.

The offensive line is terrible, my hope is that with Edelman and Amendola can get open quickly enough that Tom Brady can get the ball to them.

[Redz]

As long as the injured players can come back by the playoffs I think the Pats are still the favorites in the AFC.

The offensive line is terrible, my hope is that with Edelman and Amendola can get open quickly enough that Tom Brady can get the ball to them.

The lack of a slot receiver was very evident today - especially the first half. 

[Donoghus]

Interesting read about the Pats OT choice yesterday.  I get the rationale for kicking to start OT.  It actually makes sense from a field position standpoint if you can get a 3 & out or even allow a first down or two before getting them to punt.   However, I didn't know the exact numbers and found it pretty interesting.

From Alex Speier:  http://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2015/12/28/odds-were-patriots-side-following-overtime-decision/Lv834z7ZjYEF2X0pyquGuL/story.html?event=event25

It’s an easy second-guess. The Patriots lost to the Jets in overtime on Sunday, 26-20, and never had possession of the ball. Ergo, the decision to kick the ball to open the bonus period represented a mistake. But is that view backed by evidence?

The Patriots-Jets game was the 67th regular season overtime contest in the four years since the NFL altered its rules to guarantee teams at least one possession unless there’s an overtime-opening touchdown. In that time, the opening possession hasn’t been a huge factor in the outcome.


Teams that opened overtime with the football have a 33-31-3 record (.507) in the last four years. In essence, there’s little evident statistical impact of having the first overtime possession. So, initially, there is little impact to the decision about whether to receive or kick to open extra time.

However, as the Patriots saw, there’s risk associated with the decision to kick the ball. In the four years of current overtime rules, there are 11 instances (16.4 percent) in which the team that received the ball marched down the field and scored a game-winning touchdown without giving their opponents a chance to touch the ball. One could look at that one-in-six chance of losing the game without having an opportunity to win as decisive.

A field goal on the opening drive also creates a significant chance of a win. In 13 instances of overtime-opening drives that ended in field goals, the receiving teams forged a record of 10-1-2. In other words, points on the first drive of overtime are almost always decisive – with teams having won just one of 67 times (1.5 percent) after the receiving team converts the opening kickoff into points.

The consequences, then, of allowing points on the opening drive appear overwhelming to the point where, on the surface, it’s hard to see the logic of kicking. But that lens fails to appreciate the impact of opening overtime with a stop.

Nearly two-thirds of overtime-opening drives (43 of 67, or 64 percent) did not result in points. In other words, planning for the worst-case scenario (allowing points on the first drive) is not the same thing as planning for the likeliest scenario (not allowing points on the first drive). And the payoff of the likeliest scenario (not allowing points) tends to be huge. Teams that produce a stop on the first drive of overtime are 30-12-1, meaning that a stop results in victory 69.8 percent of the time.


In other words, based on four years of evidence under current overtime rules, if a coach believes that his defense stands a solid likelihood of stopping an opponent on its first drive, then there’s a strong argument in favor of kicking the ball. To summarize:

Chance an opponent scores on the first drive of overtime: 36 percent

Chance of win/tie if an opponent scores on the first drive of overtime: 12.5 percent

Chance an opponent doesn’t score on the first drive of overtime: 64 percent

Chance of win/tie if an opponent doesn’t score on the first drive of overtime: 72.1 percent

Those statistics can be reduced to far simpler terms. If a coach believes that his defense is good enough to achieve the likeliest outcome, there’s a strong argument that favors kicking rather than receiving to open overtime – particularly if the offense hasn’t given an indication that it will exceed its most likely result (not scoring).

In the case of the Patriots on Sunday, in a game where their defense had looked above-average and their offense had been below average en route to 13 points in four quarters (with seven points representing the work of the defense), a case can be made that New England played with the odds, as opposed to trying to buck them, with their decision to kick rather than receive in overtime.

[slamtheking]

Interesting read about the Pats OT choice yesterday.  I get the rationale for kicking to start OT.  It actually makes sense from a field position standpoint if you can get a 3 & out or even allow a first down or two before getting them to punt.   However, I didn't know the exact numbers and found it pretty interesting.

From Alex Speier:  http://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2015/12/28/odds-were-patriots-side-following-overtime-decision/Lv834z7ZjYEF2X0pyquGuL/story.html?event=event25

It’s an easy second-guess. The Patriots lost to the Jets in overtime on Sunday, 26-20, and never had possession of the ball. Ergo, the decision to kick the ball to open the bonus period represented a mistake. But is that view backed by evidence?

The Patriots-Jets game was the 67th regular season overtime contest in the four years since the NFL altered its rules to guarantee teams at least one possession unless there’s an overtime-opening touchdown. In that time, the opening possession hasn’t been a huge factor in the outcome.


Teams that opened overtime with the football have a 33-31-3 record (.507) in the last four years. In essence, there’s little evident statistical impact of having the first overtime possession. So, initially, there is little impact to the decision about whether to receive or kick to open extra time.

However, as the Patriots saw, there’s risk associated with the decision to kick the ball. In the four years of current overtime rules, there are 11 instances (16.4 percent) in which the team that received the ball marched down the field and scored a game-winning touchdown without giving their opponents a chance to touch the ball. One could look at that one-in-six chance of losing the game without having an opportunity to win as decisive.

A field goal on the opening drive also creates a significant chance of a win. In 13 instances of overtime-opening drives that ended in field goals, the receiving teams forged a record of 10-1-2. In other words, points on the first drive of overtime are almost always decisive – with teams having won just one of 67 times (1.5 percent) after the receiving team converts the opening kickoff into points.

The consequences, then, of allowing points on the opening drive appear overwhelming to the point where, on the surface, it’s hard to see the logic of kicking. But that lens fails to appreciate the impact of opening overtime with a stop.

Nearly two-thirds of overtime-opening drives (43 of 67, or 64 percent) did not result in points. In other words, planning for the worst-case scenario (allowing points on the first drive) is not the same thing as planning for the likeliest scenario (not allowing points on the first drive). And the payoff of the likeliest scenario (not allowing points) tends to be huge. Teams that produce a stop on the first drive of overtime are 30-12-1, meaning that a stop results in victory 69.8 percent of the time.


In other words, based on four years of evidence under current overtime rules, if a coach believes that his defense stands a solid likelihood of stopping an opponent on its first drive, then there’s a strong argument in favor of kicking the ball. To summarize:

Chance an opponent scores on the first drive of overtime: 36 percent

Chance of win/tie if an opponent scores on the first drive of overtime: 12.5 percent

Chance an opponent doesn’t score on the first drive of overtime: 64 percent

Chance of win/tie if an opponent doesn’t score on the first drive of overtime: 72.1 percent

Those statistics can be reduced to far simpler terms. If a coach believes that his defense is good enough to achieve the likeliest outcome, there’s a strong argument that favors kicking rather than receiving to open overtime – particularly if the offense hasn’t given an indication that it will exceed its most likely result (not scoring).

In the case of the Patriots on Sunday, in a game where their defense had looked above-average and their offense had been below average en route to 13 points in four quarters (with seven points representing the work of the defense), a case can be made that New England played with the odds, as opposed to trying to buck them, with their decision to kick rather than receive in overtime.

I feel like an idiot here so please help me out.  how is there still a chance of winning OT if the opposition scores first?  As far as I knew, once someone scores, that's it -- game over.

[Donoghus]

Interesting read about the Pats OT choice yesterday.  I get the rationale for kicking to start OT.  It actually makes sense from a field position standpoint if you can get a 3 & out or even allow a first down or two before getting them to punt.   However, I didn't know the exact numbers and found it pretty interesting.

From Alex Speier:  http://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2015/12/28/odds-were-patriots-side-following-overtime-decision/Lv834z7ZjYEF2X0pyquGuL/story.html?event=event25

It’s an easy second-guess. The Patriots lost to the Jets in overtime on Sunday, 26-20, and never had possession of the ball. Ergo, the decision to kick the ball to open the bonus period represented a mistake. But is that view backed by evidence?

The Patriots-Jets game was the 67th regular season overtime contest in the four years since the NFL altered its rules to guarantee teams at least one possession unless there’s an overtime-opening touchdown. In that time, the opening possession hasn’t been a huge factor in the outcome.


Teams that opened overtime with the football have a 33-31-3 record (.507) in the last four years. In essence, there’s little evident statistical impact of having the first overtime possession. So, initially, there is little impact to the decision about whether to receive or kick to open extra time.

However, as the Patriots saw, there’s risk associated with the decision to kick the ball. In the four years of current overtime rules, there are 11 instances (16.4 percent) in which the team that received the ball marched down the field and scored a game-winning touchdown without giving their opponents a chance to touch the ball. One could look at that one-in-six chance of losing the game without having an opportunity to win as decisive.

A field goal on the opening drive also creates a significant chance of a win. In 13 instances of overtime-opening drives that ended in field goals, the receiving teams forged a record of 10-1-2. In other words, points on the first drive of overtime are almost always decisive – with teams having won just one of 67 times (1.5 percent) after the receiving team converts the opening kickoff into points.

The consequences, then, of allowing points on the opening drive appear overwhelming to the point where, on the surface, it’s hard to see the logic of kicking. But that lens fails to appreciate the impact of opening overtime with a stop.

Nearly two-thirds of overtime-opening drives (43 of 67, or 64 percent) did not result in points. In other words, planning for the worst-case scenario (allowing points on the first drive) is not the same thing as planning for the likeliest scenario (not allowing points on the first drive). And the payoff of the likeliest scenario (not allowing points) tends to be huge. Teams that produce a stop on the first drive of overtime are 30-12-1, meaning that a stop results in victory 69.8 percent of the time.


In other words, based on four years of evidence under current overtime rules, if a coach believes that his defense stands a solid likelihood of stopping an opponent on its first drive, then there’s a strong argument in favor of kicking the ball. To summarize:

Chance an opponent scores on the first drive of overtime: 36 percent

Chance of win/tie if an opponent scores on the first drive of overtime: 12.5 percent

Chance an opponent doesn’t score on the first drive of overtime: 64 percent

Chance of win/tie if an opponent doesn’t score on the first drive of overtime: 72.1 percent

Those statistics can be reduced to far simpler terms. If a coach believes that his defense is good enough to achieve the likeliest outcome, there’s a strong argument that favors kicking rather than receiving to open overtime – particularly if the offense hasn’t given an indication that it will exceed its most likely result (not scoring).

In the case of the Patriots on Sunday, in a game where their defense had looked above-average and their offense had been below average en route to 13 points in four quarters (with seven points representing the work of the defense), a case can be made that New England played with the odds, as opposed to trying to buck them, with their decision to kick rather than receive in overtime.

I feel like an idiot here so please help me out.  how is there still a chance of winning OT if the opposition scores first?  As far as I knew, once someone scores, that's it -- game over.

If they score a TD, it's game over.  If they score a FG, the other team gets a possession.

NFL changed the OT rules a few years back.

[Eja117]

I don't think the Pats were trying to win that bad. I don't think it was a primary objective. I think it's even possible they wanted the Jets to win.

[CelticSince83]

Interesting read about the Pats OT choice yesterday.  I get the rationale for kicking to start OT.  It actually makes sense from a field position standpoint if you can get a 3 & out or even allow a first down or two before getting them to punt.   However, I didn't know the exact numbers and found it pretty interesting.

From Alex Speier:  http://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2015/12/28/odds-were-patriots-side-following-overtime-decision/Lv834z7ZjYEF2X0pyquGuL/story.html?event=event25

It’s an easy second-guess. The Patriots lost to the Jets in overtime on Sunday, 26-20, and never had possession of the ball. Ergo, the decision to kick the ball to open the bonus period represented a mistake. But is that view backed by evidence?

The Patriots-Jets game was the 67th regular season overtime contest in the four years since the NFL altered its rules to guarantee teams at least one possession unless there’s an overtime-opening touchdown. In that time, the opening possession hasn’t been a huge factor in the outcome.


Teams that opened overtime with the football have a 33-31-3 record (.507) in the last four years. In essence, there’s little evident statistical impact of having the first overtime possession. So, initially, there is little impact to the decision about whether to receive or kick to open extra time.

However, as the Patriots saw, there’s risk associated with the decision to kick the ball. In the four years of current overtime rules, there are 11 instances (16.4 percent) in which the team that received the ball marched down the field and scored a game-winning touchdown without giving their opponents a chance to touch the ball. One could look at that one-in-six chance of losing the game without having an opportunity to win as decisive.

A field goal on the opening drive also creates a significant chance of a win. In 13 instances of overtime-opening drives that ended in field goals, the receiving teams forged a record of 10-1-2. In other words, points on the first drive of overtime are almost always decisive – with teams having won just one of 67 times (1.5 percent) after the receiving team converts the opening kickoff into points.

The consequences, then, of allowing points on the opening drive appear overwhelming to the point where, on the surface, it’s hard to see the logic of kicking. But that lens fails to appreciate the impact of opening overtime with a stop.

Nearly two-thirds of overtime-opening drives (43 of 67, or 64 percent) did not result in points. In other words, planning for the worst-case scenario (allowing points on the first drive) is not the same thing as planning for the likeliest scenario (not allowing points on the first drive). And the payoff of the likeliest scenario (not allowing points) tends to be huge. Teams that produce a stop on the first drive of overtime are 30-12-1, meaning that a stop results in victory 69.8 percent of the time.


In other words, based on four years of evidence under current overtime rules, if a coach believes that his defense stands a solid likelihood of stopping an opponent on its first drive, then there’s a strong argument in favor of kicking the ball. To summarize:

Chance an opponent scores on the first drive of overtime: 36 percent

Chance of win/tie if an opponent scores on the first drive of overtime: 12.5 percent

Chance an opponent doesn’t score on the first drive of overtime: 64 percent

Chance of win/tie if an opponent doesn’t score on the first drive of overtime: 72.1 percent

Those statistics can be reduced to far simpler terms. If a coach believes that his defense is good enough to achieve the likeliest outcome, there’s a strong argument that favors kicking rather than receiving to open overtime – particularly if the offense hasn’t given an indication that it will exceed its most likely result (not scoring).

In the case of the Patriots on Sunday, in a game where their defense had looked above-average and their offense had been below average en route to 13 points in four quarters (with seven points representing the work of the defense), a case can be made that New England played with the odds, as opposed to trying to buck them, with their decision to kick rather than receive in overtime.

TP.  The way the game was going it was the right move.  I couldn't see them executing an 80 yard TD drive to win the game.  Playing the field position game made sense.  It was a lack of execution not strategy that cost the game.  Oh well.  Still in great shape sans Vollmer going down which I haven't read anything about yet, but am guessing he is done which creates a hell of a lot more issues than losing this game. 

[Neurotic Guy]

Tom Brady 2 for 2 passing in the 2nd quarter.  Relying on the run today against a Miami team that looks pretty bad.   

[KeepRondo]

That looked pretty bad for Brady.

[KeepRondo]

Tom Brady 2 for 2 passing in the 2nd quarter.  Relying on the run today against a Miami team that looks pretty bad.

after seeing that hit from Suh, I get why we are seeing all these run plays.

[Neurotic Guy]

So Brady's ankle is hurt.     I know he'll be back in, but how about letting Jimmy play in this one?   Running 90% anyway.

[KeepRondo]

So Brady's ankle is hurt.     I know he'll be back in, but how about letting Jimmy play in this one?   Running 90% anyway.

was thinking the same thing.

[Donoghus]

It's pretty apparent the Pats could care less about winning this game. Handful of inactives, super conservative play calling, going thru the motions.

The Brady scare aside, they're just trying to get thru this game and not get anyone killed.

[Neurotic Guy]

Meanwhile, the Jets doing all they can to assure the Steelers get into the playoffs.  A 20 yard punt from their own end zone, a missed 39 yard FG.  Terrible. 

[Neurotic Guy]

It's pretty apparent the Pats could care less about winning this game. Handful of inactives, super conservative play calling, going thru the motions.

The Brady scare aside, they're just trying to get thru this game and not get anyone killed.

No more injuries is paramount, but this Dolphins team is so beatable even with 2nd-teamers.